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TITLE: 
 
Charismatic leadership and corporate cultism at Enron: 
The elimination of dissent, the promotion of conformity and organizational collapse 
 
Abstract 
Enron stands out as one of the most spectacular failures in business history. Thus far, 
most attention has been focused on its accountancy practices. This paper, by contrast, 
explores its internal culture and the leadership practices of its top people. These included 
a particular emphasis on charismatic leadership, particularly in the persons of Kenneth 
Lay and Jeffrey Skilling; the promotion of a compelling vision by these leaders, of a 
totalistic nature; individual consideration, expressed in a recruitment system designed to 
activate a process analogous to conversion; and the promotion of a culture characterized 
by conformity and the penalizing of dissent. Drawing on the vast archive of material now 
available on Enron, and in particular on the best known accounts of former employees, 
the paper discusses to what extent Enron can be usefully regarded as an example of a 
corporate cult. Finally, the discussion is located in the context of emerging trends in 
business and leadership practice, and considers the extent to which what happened in 
Enron is suggestive of a growing business phenomenon. 
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Introduction 
 
On the eve of its bankruptcy in 2001, Enron declared its intention to become the world’s 
leading company. At that stage, by some measures of turnover, it was the seventh largest 
company in the US (Gordon, 2002) and was at one point valued at $70 billion by the 
stock exchange (Steiger, 2002). Thus, the scale of its ambition had some credibility. But 
its demise may instead ensure that its fate is to become the most analysed case study of 
failure in business history. Myriad analyses have now been published, outlining its 
trading practices (Steiger, 2002), exploring the implications for the communication 
aspects of business ethics (May and Zorn, 2003) and ethics more generally (Peppas, 
2003), its likely impact on business education (Dean, 2003), the challenges posed for the 
accounting profession (e.g. Semple, 2002; Copeland, 2003; Holt and Eccles, 2003; 
Tinker, 2003), implications for the role of non-executive directors (Peaker, 2003) and the 
role more generally of corporate governance (Vinten, 2002; Weidenbaum, 2002). Trust in 
visionary leaders is among the most immediate casualties of the Enron debacle (Kendall, 
2002).  More widely, it has resulted in a crisis of confidence in corporations (Jenkins, 
2003). 
 
This paper does not recapitulate the now familiar story of its meteoric rise and 
spectacular fall. Rather, it addresses a major gap that remains in the literature. In 
particular, while it has been noted that the Enron scandal highlights ‘a recurring 
communication dysfunction within the organizational structure of the corporation itself’ 
(Cohan, 2002, p.276), relatively little attention has been focused on what the culture of 
the organisation demonstrates about the dark side of charismatic leadership. Thus, 
although The Economist suggested in June 2000 that Enron could be viewed as ‘some 
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sort of evangelical cult’ (Sherman, 2002, p.25), the idea has not been systematically 
explored in the academic literature. This paper therefore discusses the nature of cults and 
cultic leadership, and explores the extent to which the role of Enron’s leaders was 
consistent or otherwise with the characteristics identified. Finally, the discussion is 
located in the context of the changing roles of CEOs more generally, and the extent to 
which what can be defined as corporate cultism is becoming a more common 
characteristic of organisational life. 
 
This paper draws on the academic literature on the cultic phenomenon, which has, 
however, rarely been applied to the corporate world. Information on Enron is derived 
from the vast archive of material now published on the organisation – in particular, on the 
key accounts of former employees, as exemplified by Cruver (2003), Swartz and Watkins 
(2003) and Watkins (2003a.b.). Other accounts have proliferated in the mass media and 
business press, and are broadly consistent with the sources highlighted in this analysis. 
Organisations can be viewed as narrative spaces, in which stories and accounts are 
employed by all participants to facilitate the process of sensemaking (Gabriel, 2004). It is 
therefore useful to examine the narrative structures developed by former Enron 
employees, to ascertain both their understanding of what facts matter most and identify 
the most pertinent interpretations they attach to those facts. As Gabriel (2000) has also 
pointed out, narratives are constructed with the aid of a number of interpretative devices 
or poetic tropes that are concerned with attribution – e.g. the attribution of responsibility, 
blame and credit, the attribution of causal connections and the attribution of agency. 
Thus, the accounts of organisational actors cannot be read simply to discover an 
invariable and unyielding objective truth about organisations, but rather to explore their 
meaning for the actors involved. However, in line with interpretivist approaches to 
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organisational discourse, interpretations of texts, stories and narratives are also informed 
by such factors as ‘the interpreter’s own frame of reference’ (Heracleous, 2004, p.176). 
In this case, the paper applies a conceptual framework drawn from the general literature 
on both cultic organisations and transformational leadership, and analyses the narrative 
constructs of others to ascertain to what extent their accounts of facts, intention and 
agency can be better understood from within that particular analytic framework. 
 
Thus, the approach adopted involves the close study of a number of texts which have had 
a particularly strong impact on the debate about Enron. For example, Sherry Watkins, 
who is generally regarded as the main whistleblower that brought Enron’s problems to 
public attention, has been honoured by the US Academy of Management for her 
contribution, been interviewed in the Academy of Management Executive and published 
in the Californian Management Review. Her accounts are strikingly consistent with those 
of Cruver, also used here as a key source of information about the organisation’s internal 
culture. Other data are drawn at various points from the general academic literature on 
the topic. Many researchers have critiqued aspects of Enron’s management system, such 
as its ‘rank and yank’ appraisal mechanism, but in general have neglected to consider the 
extent to which the practices they describe could be better informed by the general 
literature on charismatic leadership and cultism. However, their data is also utilised in the 
present argument. Enron is too complex a story to avail of one single explanation for its 
rise and fall. With that caveat, this paper highlights an important but still under explored 
aspect of the Enron saga, and one that has wider implications for the role of leadership in 
most business organisations. 
 
CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND CULTS 
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A widely used definition characterizes cults as ‘A group or movement exhibiting great or 
excessive devotion to some person, idea or thing, and employing unethical manipulative 
or coercive techniques of persuasion and control… designed to advance the goals of the 
group’s leaders, to the actual or possible detriment of members, their families or the 
community’ (AFF, 1986, p.119-120). Typically, cults have a shared commitment to a 
charismatic leader and uphold a transcendent ideology, the nature of which varies 
dramatically from group to group but which is as likely to be secular in nature as it is 
religious (Lalich, 2004). A cult’s leader therefore possesses enormous authority in the 
eyes of his or her followers. Having invested many of their hopes for a better life in the 
leader, followers are intrinsically motivated to look positively on the leader’s words and 
actions. The resulting high commitment of members is usually expressed in Stakhonivite 
work norms which mean that the group environment virtually monopolises their time. 
Members also replace their pre-existing beliefs and values with those of the group, lose 
confidence in their own perceptions in favour of those of the group’s leaders, and 
experience social punishments such as shunning by other members if they deviate from 
carefully prescribed norms (Langone, 1995; Singer, 1987). Conformity is critical. The 
outcome is an environment dominated by what has been described as ‘bounded choice’ 
(Lalich, 2004) – i.e. one in which the expression of only a limited and tightly regulated 
repertoire of beliefs, behaviours and emotions is permissible.  
 
Overall, the following key ingredients of cultic dynamics, which mirror the defining traits 
of transformational leadership, have been identified in the literature (Tourish and 
Pinnington, 2002): 
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1. Charismatic leadership (which may reflect some innate qualities on the part 
of the leader, but may just as easily be a socially engineered construct in the 
minds of the followers, and thus constitute an attributional phenomenon); 
2. A compelling vision/ Intellectual stimulation (the vision being of a 
transcendent or totalistic character, capable of imbuing the individual’s 
relationship to the organization with a sense of higher purpose. Meanwhile, 
intellectual stimulation is aimed at motivating followers to intensify their 
efforts in support of the vision, compellingly articulated by the group’s 
leaders); 
3. Individual consideration (or a feeling that the followers’ interests are being 
attended to, and perhaps that they are in some way important to the 
charismatic leader, leading to a process of recruitment/initiation, conversion 
and indoctrination); 
4. Promotion of a common culture (a set of norms which specify particular 
attitudes and forms of behaviour deemed to be appropriate. Within cults, these 
also minimize the expression of dissent, other than within carefully controlled 
limits, and hence produce a punitive internal environment).  
 
Each of these is now considered in-depth, and the extent to which they were at play 
within the Enron organization is explored. The dominant traits of cults are also outlined 
in Exhibit One, alongside a summary of Enron’s internal cultural dynamics that operate 
in parallel to them. 
 
Insert Exhibit One here 
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1.  CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP, DISSENT AND LEADERSHIP PRIVILEGES 
 
Leaders often possess and dramatically communicate ‘a vision’ for their organization. A 
vision has been defined as a mental image that a leader evokes to portray an idealized 
future state (Conger, 1989). Equipped with a compelling vision, charismatic leaders can 
have a ‘profound and extraordinary effects on followers’ (House and Baetz, 1979, p.339). 
Clearly, these effects may be individually benign and/ or socially useful. But they may 
also be individually harmful and/ or socially destructive. It is therefore not surprising that 
charismatic leadership has been described as a recurrent dynamic in all manner of cults, 
including doomsday cults in the 1950s (Festinger, 1957), the infamous Jonestown cult of 
the 1970s (Layton, 1999), the suicidal Heavens Gate cult in California during the 1990s 
(Lalich, 2004), and in the homicidal Aum cult in Japan (Lifton, 1999). Leaders in each of 
these groups articulated a compelling ‘vision’ that motivated their followers to display 
extraordinary levels of commitment and adopt behaviours, values and attitudes at odds 
with most people’s sense of normalcy, and which in many cases proved terminal.  
 
Given its potency, the importance of ‘vision’ has been increasingly stressed in the 
business world, in a growing volume of largely uncritical practitioner and academic 
literature (e.g. Collins, 2001). The intention is that followers should become highly 
committed to the leader’s mission, make significant personal sacrifices in the interests of 
the mission, and perform beyond the call of duty (Shamir et al., 1993). These theories 
highlight such effects as emotional attachment to the leader on the part of followers, 
greater emotional and motivational arousal, increased follower commitment to the 
mission articulated by the leader, and enhanced confidence in the leader. Leaders 
therefore often build their charismatic reputation around the energetic communication of 
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a vision, designed to solicit ever higher levels of compliance from followers (e.g. Biggart, 
1989).  
 
But the risks are considerable. In particular, Maccoby (2000) suggests that many 
charismatic leaders are narcissists. They have a strong need for power, high self-
confidence and strong convictions (De Vries et al., 1999). However, whatever their 
virtues, narcissists tend to be overly sensitive to criticism, can be poor listeners, lack 
empathy, have a distaste for mentoring and display an intense desire to compete 
(Maccoby, 2000). In addition, Conger (1990, p.50) has argued that charismatic leaders 
may find themselves prone to: 
 
‘Exaggerated self-descriptions. 
Exaggerated claims for the vision. 
A technique of fulfilling stereotypes and images of uniqueness to manipulate audiences. 
A habit of gaining commitment by restricting negative information and maximizing 
positive information. 
Use of anecdotes to distract attention away from negative statistical information. 
Creation of an illusion of control through affirming information and attributing negative 
outcomes to external causes.’ 
 
The consequences include the elimination of dissent (and therefore the promotion of a 
homogenous and insular group mentality, conducive to cultic norms); the accumulation 
of power at the center; a failure to sufficiently consider alternative courses of action, 
when they appear to conflict with a centrally ordained and inspirational vision; and a 
growing belief on the part of the leader that, other evidence notwithstanding, he or she is 
 10
indispensable to the organization’s success. Despite their attraction for many leaders, 
there is a high risk that such approaches ultimately invite failure. Grint (2000, p.420) has 
pointed out that the most successful leaders are liable to be those with the least compliant 
followers, ‘for when leaders err – and they always do – the leader with compliant 
followers will fail.’ Thus, debate and dissent are indispensable for effective decision 
making. However, such notions run counter to many of the norms of much leadership 
practice and theory – and are rarely to be found in cults. It remains to consider how they 
fared within Enron. 
 
The case of Enron 
There is ample evidence that Enron’s leadership aimed at creating an aura of charisma 
around themselves, and that in consequence they evinced each of the major defects 
identified by Conger (1990). The following quotation from a Fortune magazine article 
published in April 2000 is typical of how Enron leaders saw and projected themselves:  
‘Imagine a country-club dinner dance, with a bunch of old fogies and their wives 
shuffling around half-heartedly to the not-so-stirring sounds of Guy Lombardo and his 
All-Tuxedo Orchestra. Suddenly young Elvis comes crashing through the skylight, 
complete with gold-lame suit, shiny guitar, and gyrating hips… In the staid world of 
regulated utilities and energy companies, Enron Corp. is that gate-crashing Elvis’ 
(quoted in Sherman, 2002, p.23). 
 
Consistent with their image in the business press, Enron’s leaders engaged in ever more 
dramatic forms of self promotion. It may be a stretch to imagine Kenneth Lay, a middle 
aged businessman, as a latter day Elvis. Nevertheless, he was also described by Fortune 
magazine as a ‘revolutionary’. Jeffrey Skilling was equally adept at promoting a 
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charismatic self image. Consistent with a company wide dramaturgical predilection for 
Star Wars analogies, Cruver (2003. p.10) recounts that he was known internally as Darth 
Vader, ‘a master of the energy universe who had the ability to control people’s minds. He 
was at the peak of his strength, and he intimidated everyone. He had been lured over to 
the Dark Side from McKinsey & Company in 1990’. He dressed for the part at company 
gatherings, referred to his traders as ‘Storm Troopers’ and decorated his home in a style 
sympathetic to the Darth Vader image (Schwartz, 2002). Skilling was also sometimes 
known as ‘The Prince’, after Machiavelli. New recruits were instructed to read The 
Prince from beginning to end, or be eaten alive (Boje et al, 2004). Dramatic 
nomenclatures were not uncommon. Another senior executive, Rebecca Mark, became 
known as ‘Mark the Shark’, with all its attendant overtones of predatory aggression and 
greater competitive power (Frey, 2002).  
 
This tone appears to be typical of the unusually charismatic and extremely powerful 
image which Lay and Skilling, in particular, attempted to promulgate at every 
opportunity. It was clearly part of an intense dramaturgical effort designed to project an 
unusually alluring spectacle, and thereby convince people that they belonged to a cause 
far greater than merely being part of a business or working for a living. Hagiographic 
accounts of their accomplishments were correspondingly widespread, including in an 
influential book by Hamel (2000), entitled appropriately enough ‘Leading the 
Revolution’. Faculty at the prestigious Harvard Business School produced eleven case 
studies into Enron, uniformly lauding its ‘successes’ and commending its business model 
to others. 
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Within cults, leaders tend to live in extraordinary wealth – a disparity which is used to 
reinforce the impression that the people concerned have extraordinary abilities, insight 
and charisma. Opulence certainly characterised the lifestyle enjoyed by Enron’s top 
executives. For example, Kenneth Lay had Enron pay $7.1 million for a penthouse 
apartment, which he and his wife converted into a Venetian palace with dark woods, deep 
velvets, period statuary, and a vaulted brick ceiling in the kitchen (Swartz and Watkins, 
2003). The implication was that others could some day hope to obtain similar privileges 
for themselves – providing they embraced the value system and vision articulated by the 
leaders, emulated their behaviours and suppressed whatever critical internal voices 
occasionally threatened to surface.  
 
It thus became a further means of enforcing conformity with the vision of the charismatic 
leader, and obtaining enthusiastic demonstrations of support for whatever the general 
direction of the organisation was proclaimed to be.  
 
2.  COMPELLING VISION – INTELLECTUAL STIMULATION 
 
Typically, cults are organized around what has been defined as a ‘totalistic’ (that is, all 
embracing) vision of a new world order, way of being or form of organisation. The 
group’s leaders suggest that their vision is capable of transforming an otherwise impure 
reality. It constitutes an inspirational new paradigm. Converts, dazzled by the spectacle, 
develop a mood of absolute conviction. This immunizes them against doubt. No evidence 
is ever judged sufficient to falsify the belief system in question. Such moods have been 
defined as ‘ideological totalism’ (Lifton, 1961). The messianic leader of the organization 
seeks ever more enthusiastic expressions of agreement from the organization’s members. 
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Dissent is resistance to be overcome, rather than useful feedback. Plausibility is often 
simply a question of uncontested belief. Hence, consistent with the principle of 
consensual validation (in which the spectacle of many agreeing to a position irrationally 
convinces each person that it must be accurate), the absence of feedback loops reinforces 
belief in the sacred vision of the leader.  
 
Thus, a corporate vision whose truth is held to be self evident, which is complex in both 
form and function, whose tenets cannot be questioned, and whose acceptance is assumed 
to be indispensable for the organization’s salvation has the potential to provide 
considerable intellectual stimulation, and unleash passionate forms of ideological 
totalism.  
 
The case of Enron 
Enron’s vision was secular in nature, but within that framework became all 
encompassing. In essence, it promised people heaven on earth. If the company were to 
achieve its goals, unimagined wealth and happiness would be the lot of those fortunate 
enough to be employees at the time. This frequently led to hubris. The company’s annual 
report for 2000 typified the tone of fantasy increasingly emanating from those at the top: 
 
‘We believe wholesale gas and power in North America, Europe and Japan will grow 
from a $660 billion market to a $1.7 trillion market over the next several years. Retail 
energy services in the United States and Europe have the potential to grow from $180 
billion to $765 billion in the not-so-distant future. Broadband’s prospective global growth 
is huge – it should increase from just $17 billion today to $1.4 trillion within five years. 
Taken together, these markets present a £3.9 trillion opportunity for Enron, and we have 
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just scratched the surface’ (cited by Cruver, 2003, p.45). Around this time, Enron draped 
a huge banner at its entrance, proclaiming its latest vision – ‘FROM THE WORLD’S 
LEADING ENERGY COMPANY – TO THE WORLD’S LEADING COMPANY.’  
Such hyperbole was a normal part of Enron’s discourse. Craig and Amernic (2004) have 
highlighted numerous examples of its presence in letters to shareholders, which as they 
point out also made use of the language of war, sport and extremism, to reinforce the 
potency of what was a compelling and totalistic vision of the most dramatic kind. 
Extraordinary goals, set by the leaders, encourage group members to regard their group 
as being particularly special and engender a sense of privilege and uniqueness among 
those who belong (Lalich, 2004), as do images of the organisation being at war with 
everyone else.  
 
The wealth that could be made within Enron further encouraged feelings among 
employees that they faced a much more exalted destiny than that of people who worked 
for other companies. For those who achieved their goals, huge bonuses were available – 
to such an extent that Houston’s luxury car dealers habitually visited Enron to exhibit 
their products every bonus period (Prentice, 2003). Largesse was also extended to 
employees’ families. The prevailing philosophy, as Cruver (1003, p.191) summarised it, 
was that ‘If you were smart enough and tough enough to work at Enron, you deserved to 
live like last year’s Oscar winner.’ The consistent message to employees was that they 
were the brightest and the best, that they were greatly favoured by being selected to work 
at Enron, and that they were now charged with an evangelical mission of transforming 
how business conducted itself in the world. All accounts describe it as an intensely 
stimulating environment – to the point where many wondered how they could ever bear 
to work anywhere else again (e.g. Cruver, 2003). For those who bought into such 
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messages, it followed that extraordinary, and almost cultic, levels of commitment were 
required. 
 
Thus, work regimes of up to eighty hours a week were regarded as normal. Employees 
sacrificed their today in the hope of a better tomorrow. But, given the demands, ‘Skilling 
hired people who were very young, because very young people did not insist on coming 
in at nine or leaving at five, or on keeping things as they had always been, or, for that 
matter, on questioning authority once they had signed on with him’ (Swartz and Watkins, 
2003, p.58). As with other organisations which could be regarded as cults, a totalistic 
vision may offer plentiful intellectual stimulation. But such visions also imply high levels 
of social control. As Lalich (2004, p.18) observed: ‘In identifying with the group, 
members find meaning and purpose and a sense of belonging. This is experienced as a 
type of personal freedom and self-fulfilment. Yet that freedom is predicated on a 
decrease in personal autonomy, manifested in continuous acts of ever-increasing self-
renunciation.’ Those affected experience a diminished capacity for critical reflection. 
Specifically, in the context of Enron, Swartz and Watkins (2003, p.58) comment as 
follows on the widely held belief that hard work now might buy a liberated future: ‘That 
the single-minded pursuit of money might be self-limiting in other, psychic ways was not 
really considered.’ The problem is that unbounded commitment to career development 
encourages people to ‘treat all organizational, social and even personal relations as 
instrumental to career progress’ (Collinson, 2003, p.537). In essence, their sense of who 
and what they are becomes indistinguishable from the corporate environment and the 
priorities decreed by its leaders – a personality transformation, it should be noted, that is 
greatly valued by cult gurus of all persuasions. It is also a mindset which is increasingly 
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promoted by corporate leaders, and one that leaves those who adopt it much more liable 
to escalate their commitment beyond any point of rationality. 
 
3.  INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION, ‘LOVE BOMBING’ AND THE PROCESS 
OF CONVERSION 
 
Recruitment is clearly vital for cults, since the expansion of their influence requires a 
growing army of enthusiastic disciples. The problem is that the prospective recruit’s 
resistance is likely to be at its highest immediately before they join. They have yet to buy 
into the belief system or invest much energy in pursuit of the group’s goals, and they still 
have plentiful other choices. The challenge is to recruit and initiate people into the group, 
engage a process of conversion and then reinforce it with indoctrination. How is this 
accomplished, and to what extent did similar practices prevail at Enron? 
 
Recruitment/ Initiation 
Cults usually recruit people through a two-pronged process characterised by intense and 
emotionally draining recruitment rituals on the one hand, and what has been described as 
‘love bombing’ (Hassan, 1988) on the other.  In terms of rituals, a process is engaged that 
may stretch over several days, which exposes the would-be recruit to powerful messages 
from the leader, which requires them to express ever greater levels of support for the 
leader’s insights, and which may involve the person adopting behaviours that might 
otherwise seem irksome and certainly strange. The process has been described as a roller-
coaster, with potential recruits soaring to emotional highs and then experiencing mood 
collapses which, in total, leave them ever more vulnerable to the messages of its leaders 
(Tourish and Wohlforth, 2000). Research into group dynamics has long established that 
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when we endure particular initiation rituals or experience discomfort to join, we are then 
more inclined to exaggerate the benefits of group membership and to intensify our sense 
of commitment as a means of establishing that we belong to the group (Aronson and 
Mills, 1959). Emotionally debilitating recruitment rituals, assuming that the potential 
recruit has some intrinsic motivation for looking positively on the group, are likely to 
have precisely this effect. 
 
However, pressure alone does not suffice. Love bombing is also crucial, with the implied 
promise that that if the recruit merely accedes to the high demands of the group they will 
receive the beneficent regard of the leader and other members of the organisation. Thus, 
cult leaders make great ceremony of showing individual consideration for their members 
– at least, immediately before and after they join. Prospective recruits are showered with 
attention, which expands to affection and then often grows into a simulation of love. This 
is the courtship phase of the recruitment ritual. The leader wishes to seduce the new 
recruit into the organization’s embrace, gradually habituating them to its rituals and belief 
systems. Individual consideration overcomes moods of resistance, by blurring 
distinctions between personal relationships, theoretical constructs and bizarre behaviours. 
Nor is most people’s receptiveness to such tactics at all surprising. As an early researcher 
into interpersonal attraction and influence expressed it (Jones, 1990, p.178) 
 
‘There is little secret or surprise in the contention that we like people who agree with us, 
who say nice things about us, who seem to possess such positive attributes as warmth, 
understanding, and compassion, and who would ‘go out of their way’ to do things for us.’ 
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The problem is exacerbated by status differentials. Normally, a person of lesser status 
attaches more importance to being liked by those of higher status than the other way 
round (Rosenfeld et al., 1995). Within cults, and certainly within most corporations, 
status differentials between leaders and followers are both manifest and growing. For 
example, in 1991, ‘the standard big-company CEO in the US earned 140 times the pay of 
the average worker; the multiple is now nearer 500 times’ (Haigh, 2003, p.5). Individual 
consideration from such figures – the message that the new recruit is positively valued 
and very much wanted - increases the person’s tendency to affiliate, conform and engage 
in yet further behaviours consistent with well established group norms. 
 
Conversion 
When someone responds to intense individual consideration from higher status leaders, 
and is desperate to affiliate with them, the outcome of their shift in attitudes can be 
regarded as conversion. It occurs when a person experiences fundamental changes of 
knowledge and beliefs, values and standards, emotional attachments and needs, and of 
everyday conduct (Lewin, 1948; Lalich, 2004). New dress codes, behaviours, beliefs and 
modes of being are embraced. Each reinforces the other. A new dress code is likely to 
encourage the adoption of behaviours normally associated with the dress code; novel 
behaviours strengthen the attitudes that underpin them; the overall effect is, frequently, 
what outside observers come to see as a fundamental personality transformation, or new 
mode of being, on the part of the person concerned. 
 
Indoctrination 
The convert mentality is then reinforced within the cultic environment by a process of 
indoctrination. Indoctrination occurs through the one way transmission of intense 
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messages from leaders to followers that require ever greater levels of devotion to the 
group ideal, and which are designed to instil into the recruit a feeling that being accepted 
into the group is a particular privilege that makes him or her a member of a special elite. 
Thus, recruitment/ initiation, conversion and indoctrination are all vital stages in the 
cultic experience, and are sustained through the impression of individual consideration by 
the group’s leaders. The question is: to what extent were they prevalent within Enron, 
and to what extent do they characterise the wider corporate environment? 
 
The case of Enron 
Recruitment/ Initiation 
Recruitment at Enron was a particularly gruelling procedure. Fusaro and Miller (2002, 
p.49) reported that job candidates ‘…had to demonstrate that they could maintain high 
levels of work intensity over an extended period of time. Some have compared the work 
environment and high employee intensity at Enron to that of a top law firm, which is 
typically filled with brilliant young associates willing to do whatever it takes to make 
partner.’ It was clear that those selected would be required to devote most of their waking 
hours to their new life as Enron employees. In this regard, as has already been 
highlighted, Enron certainly delivered on expectations. After the initial interview, they 
then attended a second interview on one of three to five “Super Saturdays” that were held 
at Enron’s Houston office. Candidates were interviewed for 50 minutes by eight different 
interviewers in succession with one 10-minute break – an emotionally intense experience 
for all. Initially, prospective employees staged a dramatic performance designed to 
convince the recruiter that they view the company’s vision with the mindset of True 
Believers, even if they felt doubts – a normal aspect of impression management during 
selection interviews. However, performance has hazards. As Goffman (1959, p.28) 
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stressed, ‘…one finds that the performer can be fully taken in by his own act; he can be 
sincerely convinced that the impression of reality which he stages is the real reality.’ The 
further emulation of organisational rituals heightens the effect. For example, Kunda 
(1992) demonstrated, in an ethnographic study of a hi-tech American corporation, how 
such rituals are developed by leaders to inculcate the ‘right beliefs’. Employees then play 
along with them, rather than reveal what might be described as a ‘bad attitude.’ But this 
renders them liable to internalise the values behind the rituals – even if they have initially 
resisted them. In essence, like a Method actor over preparing a part, the person 
internalises a role to such an extent that they become indistinguishable from their 
performance. Within Enron, there was intense pressure to participate in a whole variety 
of rituals – including those associated with ostentatious consumption – and which had 
precisely these effects. 
 
Conversion 
It is thus likely that, within Enron, the dramaturgically focused selection process and 
subsequent induction into a high performance work environment initiated a process 
analogous to cultic conversion, in which prospective employees 
• needed overwhelming levels of intrinsic motivation to persevere 
• found themselves exposed to a high demand environment, in which it was made 
clear that those selected would be required to display further levels of inordinate 
commitment 
• were exposed to the notion that membership of the Enron team represented a 
particular privilege, but also imposed unusually high obligations 
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• were presented with the ‘vision’ proclaimed by Enron’s leaders, and required to 
frequently express their solidarity with a dominant and centrally ordained 
corporate philosophy. 
 
All this was reinforced by various versions of love bombing – once the person was 
selected, and agreed to join, the organisation. As many have noted, Enronians were 
frequently told, and came to believe, that they were the brightest and best employees in 
the world. They were certainly well rewarded, and were the eager recipients of a great 
deal of company largesse. For example, many had access to company credit cards, on 
which they were encouraged to charge their prostitution expenses (Fusaro and Miller, 
2003). Providing they performed to a high standard, they could count on an unlimited 
benevolent attitude from Enron’s leaders. 
 
Indoctrination 
What can be viewed as indoctrination, flowing from the organisation’s leaders, then 
became a normal part of life throughout the employee’s Enron career. The further one 
ascended the hierarchy, the more one was exposed to it. A typical example can be found 
in the company’s 1999 management conference, as described by Swartz and Watkins 
(2003, p.7). They reported that the then CEO, Jeffrey Skilling, turned the event into ‘a 
grim tutorial on “growing earnings” or, in layman’s terms, boosting profits… the Hyatt’s 
ballroom felt like a reeducation camp, as every speaker stressed the new corporate 
dogma, which was that Enron’s hard assets could no longer be depended on to keep the 
stock price rising at Skilling’s desired rate of 20 percent a year.... Enron’s mandate was to 
become more nimble, more flexible, more innovative – or else. The speakers… had 
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droned on about that mission for hours. Most of that day, Skilling prowled the perimeter 
of the ballroom, making sure that his acolytes were, in his words, “getting it”’.  
 
In this, and other accounts of Enron, communication emerges as essentially one way – 
from the organisation’s top leaders, to those at the bottom. Its purpose was to reinforce 
the demanding goals set by Enron’s leaders. Corrective feedback was not sought. In fact, 
it was stifled. The purpose was simply to transmit a new corporate code, and ensure its 
rapid implementation. People were expected to escalate their commitment, and transform 
their attitudes to be ever more consistent with the needs of the organisation’s leaders. The 
dynamic is similar to that of many non-corporate cults, as documented in a growing case 
study literature into the area (e.g. Hassan, 1988; Tourish, 1998; Stein; 2002). 
 
4.  PROMOTING A COMMON CULTURE 
 
Much of the most influential management literature in the last two decades, inspired by 
the work of Peters and Waterman (1982), sold the notion of what amounts to a 
monolithic organisational culture, to be determined exclusively by senior managers, as 
the key to overall success. The importance of this resides in the notion that organizational 
cultures consist of cognitive systems explaining how people think, reason and make 
decisions (Pettigrew, 1979; 1990). If cultures can therefore be controlled by those at the 
top, the overall impact on people is likely to be enormous. In such schemas, the views of 
non-managerial employees, women and/or minorities are unlikely to be considered 
(Martin, 1992).  
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It has rarely been pointed out that the most intense organisational cultures (invariably 
determined by those at the top, with minimal input from below), are to be found within 
cults. In particular, such organisations promote all embracing cultures, decreed by the 
leader. These are built around totalistic world views, with which everyone is supposed to 
agree. The ideal state is one of monoculturism, in which difference from the vision of the 
leader is banished to the margins of the group’s tightly policed norms. Total conformity 
along these lines leads to the disabling and well documented phenomenon of groupthink, 
an infection which thrives particularly well in the overheated atmosphere of cults 
(Wexler and Fraser, 1995). This is particularly relevant to the study of modern business 
organisations. As a growing volume of literature testifies, workplace surveillance systems 
increasingly seek to produce conformist (i.e. compliant and pliant) individuals in the 
workplace. Thus, corporate culture initiatives (Kunda, 1992), performance assessment 
systems (Townley, 1994), teamworking (Barker, 1993) and information gathering 
systems (Zuboff, 1988) have all been explored from this perspective.  It has been argued 
that such approaches seek to regulate, discipline and control employee subject selves, 
while camouflaging such intentions in the more benign rhetoric of family values and 
empowerment (Martin, 1999). 
 
Within systems characterized by surveillance, and in which strident demands for intense 
commitment becomes the norm, the demand for purity is central. This is expressed with 
particular sharpness within cults, where ‘...the experiential world is sharply divided into 
the pure and the impure, into the absolutely good and the absolutely evil’ (Lifton, 1961, 
p.423). Dissent is demonized, rendering it all the more unappealing, since people quickly 
grasp that to associate with dissenters is to volunteer for a Salem style witch-hunt. They 
are constantly informed that the group’s vision offers a superior insight to any other 
 24
perspective on offer. Dress codes, language, and styles of interaction are all highly 
regulated (Tobias and Lalich, 1994), reinforcing the monochrome environment that has 
come to define the members’ social world. Typically, the culture is one of impassioned 
belief, incessant action to achieve the group’s goals, veneration of the leader’s vision and 
a constraining series of group norms designed to quell dissent. Within cults, the dominant 
culture is likely to be totalistic, punitive, self-aggrandizing and all embracing in its 
messianic scope (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). Culture, in such contexts, becomes 
another form of social control (Willmott, 1993; 2003).  
 
A further paradox within cults is that individual consideration shifts from being positive 
to critical in nature. As a voluminous literature testifies (e.g. Tourish, 1998), once the 
recruit has been ‘won over’, and made an intense commitment, the group seeks to ensure 
the further embrace of its norms, by a relentless process of criticism and attack. 
Individual consideration of a positive kind (Dr Jekyll) alternates with its alter ego (Mr. 
Hyde). Relentless criticism gradually erodes people’s confidence in their own perceptions 
(Tourish and Wohlforth, 2000), creating a form of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). 
‘Love’ – always dependent on the unconditional expression of enthusiasm for the goals 
of the group’s leaders – alternates with abuse, in a disorienting cycle that leaves 
recipients feeling fearful and powerless. Context is crucial. Having made an initial 
commitment, possibly of a dramatic kind, recruits are motivated to engage in further 
behaviours consistent with the commitment originally made – the principle of 
commitment and consistency (Cialdini, 2001). When this blends with learned 
helplessness, it reinforces even further people’s already strong inclination to over-identify 
with the norms that have been decreed by the group’s leaders. The leaders, meanwhile, 
have adorned themselves in the garb of omniscience and infallibility. Paradoxically, and 
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providing it has come after a period of love bombing, criticism from such sources 
reinforces the person’s attachment to the group’s belief system and their sense of loyalty 
to its leaders.  
 
Moreover, abuse generates multiple insecurities, further strengthening leadership power. 
Whatever its precise content, insecurity reinforces ‘the construction of workplace selves 
and the reproduction of organizational power relations’ (Collinson, 2003, p.530). In 
particular, it seems likely that when people are insecure about their self-identity and their 
status the nominal freedom of their position (after all, they retain the choice to leave) will 
be experienced as a form of existential angst, intensifying their sense of vulnerability. It 
has long been known that people have an innate tendency to conform to authority and 
power under a variety of conditions (Milgram, 1974). If they are rendered fearful in the 
manner described here, and when the most modest expression of dissent attracts punitive 
attention from those above, it seems even more likely that people ‘might try to find 
shelter in the perceived security of being told what to do and what to think, viewing this 
as a less threatening alternative to the responsibility of making decisions and choices for 
themselves’ (Collinson, 2003, p.531). When the group environment assumes that all 
change must start at the top, the leader knows best, the leader must have a compelling 
vision and that one unifying culture is a precondition of effectiveness, inherently cult like 
dynamics of the kind described here may be unleashed. It is clear that many of these 
assumptions are now standard features of the leadership culture in many corporate 
organisations. 
 
The case of Enron: 
1. ‘Rank and yank’, and the elimination of dissent 
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Side by side with largesse and ego stroking, a punitive internal culture was established, in 
which all that had been so painstakingly gained could be withdrawn at the whim of senior 
managers. As Fusaro and Miller (2003, p.51) remarked: ‘Despite all the effort that Enron 
expended in selecting the right people to hire into the company, it was quick to fire 
them.’ The most striking illustration of this was in the organisation’s appraisal system, 
known as ‘rank and yank’. An internal Performance Review Committee (PRC) rated 
employees twice a year (Gladwell, 2002). They were graded on a scale of 1 to 5, on ten 
separate criteria, and then divided into one of three groups – ‘A’s, who were to be 
challenged and given large rewards; ‘B’s, who were to be encouraged and affirmed, and 
‘C’s, who were told to shape up or ship out. Those in the top category were referred to as 
‘water walkers’ (Swartz and Watkins, 2003). Those in the bottom category were given 
until their next review to improve. In practice, however, with another 15 percent category 
emerging within six months sufficient improvement was almost impossible, and they 
tended to leave quickly. Furthermore, those in categories 2 and 3 were also now in a 
position where they too faced the strong possibility of being ‘yanked’ within the next 
year. A cutthroat culture was created. The overall, and distinctly cultic, impact is well 
summarised by Fusaro and Miller (2003, p.52):  
‘It is clear that Enron’s management regarded kindness as a show of weakness. The same 
rigors that Enron faced in the marketplace were brought into the company in a way that 
destroyed morale and internal cohesion. In the process of trying to quickly and efficiently 
separate from the company those employees who were not carrying their weight, Enron 
created an environment where employees were afraid to express their opinions or to 
question unethical and potentially illegal business practices. Because the rank-and-yank 
system was both arbitrary and subjective, it was easily used by managers to reward blind 
loyalty and quash brewing dissent.’ 
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Ultimately, cults thrive on internal aggression. The punitive internal atmosphere reminds 
members of the fate that awaits them should they dissent, or deliver performance below 
the high goals set for them by the group’s leaders. In addition, by keeping members 
fearful of each other, their attention is further diverted from the behaviour of the group’s 
leaders. Within Enron, it appears that the tyrannization personified by the rank and yank 
system unleashed what has been described, in other contexts, as the ‘identification-with-
the-aggressor syndrome’ (Kets de Vries, 2001). This postulates that, in order to feel safer, 
those at the receiving end of aggression assume an aggressive posture themselves. They 
move from being threatened to being threatening. The catch is that ‘all they accomplish is 
to become aggressors themselves, thus increasing the total organizational aggression’ 
(Kets de Vries, 2001, p.81). Intense criticism aimed at individuals stresses the imagined 
weaknesses of the person at the receiving end rather than, for example, difficulties with 
the wider organisation. The rank and yank system therefore pitted employees against 
each other. It was clearly in every individual’s interest that someone other than 
themselves received a poor rating. This created a strong incentive to provide poor 
evaluations for others while simultaneously seeking positive evaluations for oneself. 
Backroom deals, shifting alliances and broken promises were the norm. It also provided 
an incentive to conformity, and a disincentive to the articulation of dissenting voice. But 
there was no escaping the relentless logic of the bottom line. Whatever they did, 15% of 
all employees would find themselves in the lowest category twice a year, where they 
faced the daunting prospect of being yanked.  
 
Clearly, the switch from affirmation to punishment within Enron meant that employees 
regularly received mixed messages. On the one hand, they were the cleverest and best in 
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the world – a form of positive reinforcement, or love bombing, that it would be hard to 
better. On the other, they could be branded as ‘losers’ (a favourite term of abuse, for 
those who fell at the PRC hurdle), and fired at any time. Consistent with general cultic 
norms, the overall effect was disorientation, an erosion of one’s confidence in one’s own 
perceptions and, most crucially, a further compliance with the group’s leaders that 
strengthened conformist behaviour in general. Thus, mixed messages within cults are a 
standard means of projecting ‘the illusion of choice’ (Lalich, 2004, p.190), while actually 
intensifying control by the group’s leaders. Such messages also constrain topics of 
discussion, further reinforcing conformist behaviours. As Werther (2003, p.569) 
expressed it, the ambiguities and inconsistencies of mixed messages became 
undiscussable within Enron. But the prevailing culture rendered ‘the undiscussability of 
the undiscussable also undiscussable.’ There were no forums where employees could 
communicate about such concerns, beyond whatever informal grapevines managed to 
survive in such a hostile climate. 
 
Thus, within Enron, it was clear to all that dissent would not be tolerated. Anyone who 
queried accountancy practices was likely, at best, to be reassigned or lose a bonus 
(Cohan, 2002). A 1995 survey of employees found that many were uncomfortable about 
voicing their feelings and ‘telling it like it is at Enron’ (Swartz and Watkins, 2003, p.76). 
Cruver (2003, p.176) quotes a former senior’s manager’s summary of the internal culture: 
‘There was an unwritten rule… a rule of ‘no bad news.’ If I came to them with bad news, 
it would only hurt my career.’ The example of Sherron Watkins illustrates the mindset. 
Watkins was a senior employee who worked with Enron’s Chief Financial Officer, Andy 
Fastow. When she realised that the company’s losses would become apparent sometime 
in 2003 or 2004, she drew her concerns to the attention of Ken Lay, who had stepped 
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back into the role of CEO. Support was not forthcoming from other senior executives, 
who evidently feared that to acknowledge the problems would damage their careers at 
Enron. Lay’s own response suggests these fears were well founded. Within days of 
meeting with Watkins, he contacted the organization’s lawyers to inquire if grounds 
could be found for firing her (Watkins, 2003a.b.). It should be noted that the intrinsically 
modest act of approaching the CEO to voice concerns is amongst the most notable acts of 
resistance currently on record within Enron. It is also notable that its impact was 
negligible. Enron’s collapse was precipitated when it was compelled to knock $1.2billion 
off shareholder equity, rather than because of a widespread refusal to go along with its 
fraudulent practices or destructive culture by middle managers and employees. 
 
2.  A company of ‘believers’? 
In 1997, employees were interviewed about their attitudes, and, perhaps inevitably, a 
‘vision’ was adopted in response (Swartz and Watkins, 2003)1. The process and its 
outcome illustrate particularly well the extent of a common but totalistic culture within 
the organisation and a widespread over-reliance on the supposedly superior insights of 
the organisation’s leaders. The advertising agency charged with developing the new 
vision concluded that Enron was a company of “believers.” In particular, employees had 
intense faith in Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. They were also convinced that Enron 
employees (often dubbed ‘Enronians’) were the best and the brightest in the world, and 
they believed they were doing good by opening new markets and creating new products 
and services. As a result, an advertising campaign was launched, around a concept called 
“What We Believe.” Those beliefs included “the wisdom of open markets” and “being a 
laboratory for innovation.” A new Vision and Values team was created, which declared 
                                                 
1 The following discussion of Enron’s 1997 revisioning is taken from the account of Swartz and 
Watkins (2003). All quotations used here can be found in their original form in their text, on pages 
103-105. 
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that “Everything we do is about change,” It added: “Change is a goal. Change a habit. 
Change a mind.” From an outside perspective, the slogans may appear rather vacuous, as 
indeed are those of more well known and non-corporate cults. However, this may also be 
their strength. Slogans bereft of real content often enable people to read into them 
whatever meanings they wish, and thus ensures a much wider buy in. A video was also 
produced, for company wide dissemination, in which Lay proclaimed that his main 
objective was ‘to create an environment where our employees can come in here and 
realize their potential.’ He did not specify whether this ambition extended only to those 
who survived the appraisal system. As Swartz and Watkins (2003, p.103) observed: ‘The 
whole campaign was not unlike a religious tract from a New Age megachurch, but 
instead of directing disciples to God, Enron hopes its congregation would be inspired to 
join its mission to make itself The World’s Leading Energy Company.’  
 
Cruver (2003, p.37) reinforces the impression of a corporate culture resembling that of 
cults. In describing the beginning of his Enron career, he observed: ‘The first thing I 
noticed about Enron traders is that they all looked very similar: A goatee was fairly 
common; otherwise they maintained a clean-cut yet outdoorsy look; and if they didn’t 
wear some version of a blue shirt every day, then it was like they weren’t on the team… I 
recall the first time I showed up to work in a green button-down, only to realize I was 
completely surrounded by a dozen guys wearing the same blue shirt. Not just blue shirts 
– but the same blue shirt. I asked the group, “When did they hand those out?” I said it 
with a smile, but no one laughed.’ Parallels between such a rigid corporate uniform and 
the uniform dress code found in such cults as the Hare Krishnas are inescapable. 
 
 31
Language was crucial to the process. Again, the testimony of Swartz and Watkins (2003, 
p.193) is typical. They describe language within Enron as follows: ‘No one at Enron 
would ever “build consensus,” they would “come to shore,” as in “We have to come to 
shore on this,” or “Are you ready to come to shore on this?” One week somebody used 
the word “metrics” to mean the numbers in a deal, as in “We’ve got to massage the 
metrics!” Pretty soon, everyone was using the term “metrics” and anyone who used the 
term “numbers” or “calculations” was a “loser,” the most popular Enron label of all.’ 
Such constricted language, baffling to outsiders, is typical of totalistic environments 
(Lifton, 1961), and has been observed in a huge variety of cults. As Hardy and Phillips 
(2004, p.299) argue, power and discourse are mutually constitutive: discourse can ‘shape 
the system that exists in a particular context by holding in place the categories and 
identities upon which it rests.’ Control of language within Enron, in the manner described 
here, played precisely this function. It engineered a uniform definition of reality, 
consistent with a managerially sanctioned vision of the truth.  In turn, this established an 
increasingly conformist culture, similar to those found within cults, and in which the 
possibility of dissent and debate retreated ever further from the group’s practice. 
 
3.  Deception, and the control of information 
Typically, cult leaders have extraordinary authority, privileged access to information, and 
a hidden agenda of self aggrandisement that is concealed behind more idealistic 
statements. The dominant culture is maintained because ordinary followers are denied 
full information about the organisation’s goals or practices, while a carefully contrived 
public display of righteousness by the leaders prevents detailed scrutiny of actual 
behaviour as opposed to avowed intentions. Consistent with this dynamic, and with what 
has been observed in a variety of cults, information emanating from the top within Enron 
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was also distorted in nature. As Lalich (2004, p.235) noted, in a comprehensive 
comparison of two cults: ‘…the vast majority of members did not know such things as 
where the money went or how overall strategic decisions were made. Strict policies 
controlled and contained information.’ Information flow within Enron was indeed tightly 
regulated in this manner. The intended effect was to reinforce the authority of Enron’s 
leaders. People assumed that at least the leaders knew what was happening, and that they 
had their followers’ overall best interests at heart. Given what is known as the false 
consensus effect, which causes honest people to impute their honest motives to others 
(Prentice, 2003), it is not surprising that Enron employees tended to assume that such 
people as Kenneth Lay were abiding by normal accounting procedures. In reality, and 
again in practices that are consistent with those widely found in cults, ‘there was 
misrepresentation of hard data, that is, concealment of debt, lying about accounting 
results, as well as about the stream of earnings, and the distortion of the company’s future 
prospects’ (Cohan, 2002, p.280). 
 
A particularly ironic example of misinformation, deception and double standards within 
Enron can be found in its heavily promoted code of ethics, known as ‘RICE’ – an 
acronym standing for Respect, Integrity, Communication and Excellence. A 64-booklet 
was produced, explaining the code in depth. Kenneth Lay issued a memo on the code in 
July 2000, barely eighteen months before Enron declared bankruptcy, in which he 
concluded that ‘We want to be proud of Enron and to know it enjoys a reputation for 
fairness and honesty and that it is respected… Let’s keep that reputation high’ (quoted 
in Cruver, 2003, p.333 – emphasis in the original text). As is now known, Enron’s leaders 
disregarded the code in their daily practice – to such an extent that, to take but one of 
many examples, a 166-page report was published in 1999 entitled ‘The Enron 
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Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Violations’. It documented, 
amongst much else, how Enron executives paid local law enforcement officers to 
suppress legitimate and peaceful opposition to its power plant near Mumbai in India 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002). The code of ethics was thus a dramaturgical device, whose 
theatrical display cultivated the illusion of noble ideals and generated a convincing 
spectacle of ethical practice for both the organisation’s internal and external audiences 
(Boje et al., 2004).  It also helped douse whatever suspicions people may have been 
nurturing about the behaviour of the organisation’s leaders.  
 
The RICE code suggests that Enron was engaged essentially in the production and 
trading of illusions. The dominant illusion, of course, was one of high profitability. But 
the main spectacle was sustained, at a deep structure level, by myriad other theatrical 
discourses. In this instance, the RICE code suggested that the organisation’s activities 
were underpinned by a strong ethical code. The cultivation of such a belief was intended 
to facilitate intense belief, compliance, over-identification with the group’s goals and 
leaders and heightened dedication to the pursuit of declared ideals. Accordingly, the 
presentation of an image at odds with a malignant reality is a standard leadership tactic in 
most documented cults. For example, the leader of the suicidal Jonestown cult in Guyana 
in the 1970s, Jim Jones, engaged in the dramaturgy of miraculous healing in front of 
large audiences, to generate the illusion of exceptional powers, while simultaneously 
informing his closest aides that he was the reincarnation of Lenin (Layton, 1999). It is 
now clear that the architects of the Enron story also made ample use of drama, spectacle, 
and the projection of financial illusions in their daily practice.  
 
4. Producing the ‘appropriate’ individual 
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Overall, it appears that Enron inculcated a powerful set of cultural norms in its 
employees. These specified acceptable business dress, how people talked to each other, 
and what values they were supposed to subscribe to. The culture attempted to regulate 
people’s identities – an increasingly common process, and one which has the effect of 
reinforcing organizational control, through producing individuals deemed appropriate by 
the ruling group (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). It is a dynamic consistent with the role 
of culture within cults, particular in terms of its role in defining a narrow range of 
acceptable behaviours, attitudes and emotions.  
 
Paradoxically, even from Enron’s own perspective, the ultimate effect was dysfunctional 
– after all, the organisation expired. This suggests that though the methods analysed here 
may temporarily strengthen leadership control in small groups they are incompatible with 
long term growth and success. Thus, Enron maintained a façade of teamwork. But behind 
the façade lurked the ruthless self interest of its leaders – a self interest that others then 
felt compelled to emulate. As Swartz and Watkins (2003, p.192) noted: ‘There was so 
much infighting over who got financial credit for a deal in the Performance Review 
Committee that the total amount credited to individuals far exceeded the total company 
income for the year. Even so, everyone felt obliged to quibble over the smallest points, 
because if you didn’t, you got a reputation as a chump.’ Those deemed to be chumps 
were thought to be exhibiting a purely personal weakness, rather than demonstrating any 
systemic difficulties with the organisation. Such a fate and set of labels again mirrors 
those directed against dissenters in all variety of cults. They had the effect of reinforcing 
the power of Enron’s leaders. Other employees manoeuvred and conspired to avoid 
joining those in the category of ‘losers’ or ‘chumps’. Most critically, with so much effort 
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invested in face saving and self enhancement, the destructive practices of Enron’s 
leadership remained unchallenged, while a destructive corporate culture took deeper root. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that many of the dynamics found within Enron resemble those of 
organisations generally regarded as cults. In particular, it has described the existence and 
the downsides of charismatic leadership, a compelling and totalistic vision, intellectual 
stimulation aimed at transforming employees’ goals while subordinating their ethical 
sense to the needs of the corporation, individual consideration designed to shape 
behaviour, and the promotion of a common culture which was increasingly maintained by 
punitive means.  
 
The one exception is that, as the general literature testifies, cult members donate most of 
their money and possessions to their chosen cause. They endure great hardship. 
Enronians, by contrast, were well paid, with the promise of much greater wealth to come. 
On the other hand, most saw their retirement savings wiped out in Enron’s collapse, lost 
everything they had invested in its shares and received nothing more than a $4000 
severance payment when it filed for bankruptcy, while top managers were paid 
exceptionally generous retention bonuses (Watkins, 2003b.). Overall, the organisational 
culture strongly resembles that of many well known cults, as does the behaviour of 
Enron’s leaders. 
 
There have been many attempts to portray the Enron scandal as a one off or at least rare 
occurrence. In particular, President Bush characterised it as the product of poor behaviour 
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by a few ‘bad apples’, and therefore as an exceptional event (Conrad, 2003). Others have 
noted that many business commentators have effectively used Enron as a ‘scapegoat’, 
standing as a surrogate for a wider corporate malaise that is hence denied (Hensmans, 
2003). In even more optimistic vein, as Deakin and Konzelmann (2003) have critically 
observed, the exposure and then collapse of Enron has been used by some to argue that 
we can be more confident in corporate America and its regulatory regimes. In line with 
the reasoning of the latter authors, our own position does not support such an optimistic 
interpretation of events. 
 
In particular, recent years have witnessed an extraordinary growth in the power of CEOs, 
while the power of employees has declined (Mintzberg, 2004). But a corollary of great 
power is the anticipation of miraculous results. Such expectations are magnified in a 
context of social despair or helplessness (Gemmill and Oakley, 1992). Imperial CEOs, all 
too aware of the limited opportunity they are now afforded by the stock market to make a 
dramatic difference, may be tempted to resort to the theatrical approaches typical of cult 
leaders, and which were certainly the norm at Enron. In the process, they encourage 
conformity and penalise dissent. Yet the evidence indicates that effective leaders need to 
do the opposite, and in particular should ‘encourage constructive dissent, rather than 
destructive consent’ (Grint, 2005).  Enron suggests that many if not most leaders have yet 
to grasp this point, with potentially catastrophic results for their organisations. 
 
Thus, more leaders are attempting to bind employees to the corporate ideal, while 
curtailing forums for debate. They project an image of charismatic leadership, stress a 
compelling vision, depict their companies as a surrogate family and attempt to blur any 
perceived difference between the interests of managers and non-managers (Biggart, 
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1989). As an example of where this may lead, there has been a growing interest in 
‘Spiritual Management Development’ (Bell and Taylor, 2004). Within this paradigm, 
trainers attempt to release managers from ‘negative thoughts’, ‘fears’ or ‘barriers’, which 
impede the development of a successful corporate culture (Heelas, 1992). Such 
approaches seek to re-engineer the most intimate beliefs of employees, so that they are 
aligned with whatever the leader deems is helpful to the corporate enterprise.  It makes it 
even less likely that employees will ask awkward questions of their leaders, and so be 
capable of correcting their inevitable misjudgements. These may constitute fertile 
conditions for the emergence of other Enrons in the future. 
 
There is little evidence, to date, that Enron’s employees were able to offer significant 
resistance, least of all resistance that was effective. Rather, the evidence reviewed here 
indicates that a totalistic environment was created, in which the penalties for dissent were 
so severe and well known, while the benefits of conformity appeared so munificent, that 
critical voice was almost wholly absent from the organisation’s internal discourse. Of 
more general significance, the increased primacy afforded to shareholder value, the 
growing power of CEOs and market pressure for speedy results implies the further 
erosion of cultures that embrace discussion, debate and dissent. 
 
The dangers are considerable. Once people over-align themselves with a company, and 
invest excessive faith in the wisdom of its leaders, they are liable to lose their original 
sense of identity, tolerate ethical lapses they would have previously deplored, find a new 
and possibly corrosive value system taking root, and leave themselves vulnerable to 
manipulation by the leaders of the organisation, and to whom they have mistakenly 
entrusted many of their vital interests. Human beings need to believe in something, are 
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frequently naïve in where they choose to invest their belief and are vulnerable to 
dramaturgical spectacles designed to engage their loyalty. Enron ‘traded’ on the desire of 
many people to believe that ever increasing profits could be manufactured by means of 
accountancy conjuring tricks, by an organisation that was also serving a greater good – a 
secular miracle. In that context, as we have argued above, it may bequeath a cultural 
legacy that other business leaders increasingly seek to emulate. The phenomenon of 
corporate cultism may thus become more widespread, and require much closer study, 
than it has merited to date. 
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Exhibit  One: DEFINING TRAITS OF CULTS AND  THEIR PARALLELS WITHIN ENRON 
Defining Traits 
 of Cults 
Cultic Organisational Dynamics Parallels with Enron 
 
1. CHARISMATIC 
LEADERSHIP 
2. A 
COMPELLING 
VISION 
AND 
INTELLECTUAL 
STIMULATION 
• A deeply  entrenched commitment to the 
charismatic leader 
• The leader has total and absolute authority 
• Leaders build their eminence and maintain 
their  grip on their followers through a 
well-articulated, emotive communication 
of their vision 
• The leader cultivates a compelling and 
captivating  self image 
• Immense faith invested in the leaders 
• The leaders enjoy a lifestyle of much 
greater luxury than  their followers 
• Heavy emphasis on the charismatic attributes  
       of leadership 
• The CEO  had immense and  
       unchallenged authority 
• Dramaturgical events, such as annual  
       management conferences,  where leaders   
       promoted themselves in a theatrical manner.  
       For example, Skilling dressed and acted as  
       Darth Vader. 
• Hagiographic accounts of leaders in business 
       press (e.g. dubbed as ‘revolutionaries’) 
•  Intense faith exhibited by employees in  
       Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, and  a 
       declining   confidence in  the quality of 
        their  own perceptions 
• The CEO led an ultra opulent lifestyle 
• An intense transcendent ideology 
• A high degree of personal commitment by 
followers, to the goals of their leaders 
• The replacement of the follower’s existing 
belief system with a sense of being 
involved in a meaningful or revolutionary 
change or transformation  
• Stakhonivite work norms 
• A totalistic vision, leading to a higher sense 
of purpose and achievement/earnings 
• Employees assured they were transforming  
how business was conducted in the world, 
             for the common good 
• Goal set of becoming ‘the world’s  
             leading company’ 
• Intense workloads, up to eighty hours per 
week 
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• Indoctrination rituals that alternate 
between stressful and exhilarating 
• A process of conversion enacted 
• Concentrated ‘Love-bombing’, to promote 
a new sense of being 
• Ongoing  emphasis on the development of 
the followers’ devotion to intensify 
commitment at the conversion 
• Continuous indoctrination, to reinforce 
initial sense of affiliation 
 
4. PROMOTION 
OF A COMMON 
CULTURE 
 
3. INDIVIDUAL 
CONSIDERATION 
• Dissent suppressed: perceived dissenters 
marginalised and often reassigned or fired 
• Groupthink encouraged and endorsed  
• Financial data falsified 
• An unwritten internal rule of ‘no bad 
news’ 
• Low toleration of dissent: perceived 
dissenters marginalised, reassigned or fired 
• Common dress code among key employees 
• Cultivation of obscure jargon, familiar 
only to initiates within the organisation 
• Punitive internal regime (‘rank and yank’), 
designed to alternate intense positive 
reinforcement with disorienting periods of 
criticism 
• Punitive internal environment: dissent 
demonised 
• Uni-directional communication - 
downwards.  
• Negative information suppressed and  
positive information  maximised 
• Total conformity from followers 
• Uniform language and dress codes 
• Intense recruitment rituals, designed 
      to engage employees in a process  
      of affiliation 
• The transformation of attitudes,  
             behaviour and dress codes 
• Constant messages that those hired  
      were part of  a special elite and were 
       the brightest and the best  in the world 
• Ongoing indoctrination, characterised  
       by top down communication and  
       severely limited upward feedback 
